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Abstract. In this article, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model (2003) of 
network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine 
the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting 
networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks. 
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1   Introduction 
Research collaborations among firms take a variety of forms, such as joint 
ventures, technology sharing or joint R&D, and can play a prominent role in 
economic performance (Hagedoorn, 2006). These collaborations are often bilateral 
and non exclusive, and form a network of collaborative links between firms. Goyal 
and Joshi (GJ, 2003) develop a model of network formation between firms which 
compete on one market in order to predict the architectures of the networks that 
should emerge and examine to what extent these networks are socially efficient. Now 
it is often the case that firms compete in few markets. In a seminal paper, Bullow et 
al. (1985) examine how the introduction of multimarket competition can produce 
quite unexpected results. In this paper, we ask what happens to equilibrium and 
efficient networks when we introduce multimarket competition in the GJ's model of 
formation of collaborative networks. We assume for purposes of simplicity, a 
heterogeneous product market, with linear demand curves and quadratic cost 
functions, where multimarket competitors can form quality products enhancing 
collaborative links on one market. Concerning equilibrium networks it turns out that 
as in GJ (2003), equilibrium networks have a dominant group architecture, i.e. a 
group of firms are linked to each other while other firms have no links at all. We 
show that this result follows from the fact that our collaborative multimarket game 
qualifies as playing the field games (Goyal and Joshi, 2006), with payoff function 
satisfying convexity in own links as well as the strategic substitutes property with 
regard to quantities. However, using Bullow et al. (1985) analysis, we show that 
contrary to the model of GJ (2003) there exist situations where competitors do not 
form collaborative links in order to increase the quality of their products even if these 
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links have no costs. This result follows from the fact that there are joint diseconomies 
across markets and goods produced by competing firms are strategic substitutes. It 
illustrates how the intermarket effect plays a key role in the incentive of firms to 
collaborate. 
With regard to efficient networks, though we cannot arrive at a precise 
characterization of these networks, we can derive some interesting properties of such 
networks and restrict the set of networks that are efficient into a small group. More 
precisely, for four firms or more, efficient networks have only one component (or one 
group). Moreover in an efficient network the diameter of the component is very low, 
since the geodesic distance between two connected firms in the component cannot 
exceed two.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and 
discusses the notation and terminology. Section 3 examines equilibrium networks, 
while Sections 4 deals with efficient networks1. Section 5 concludes. 
2   The Framework  
2.1 The Multi-market Cournot Model 
Suppose there are n firms indexed by i = 1, 2,…, n (where n > 2) that compete a la 
Cournot in two inter-related markets A and B. We denote by qi and Qi the quantities 
sold by firm i on markets A and B respectively, and by pi and Pi the prices of firm i's 
products on these markets. Focusing on the most interesting case, we suppose that 
competitors' products are strategic substitutes and there are diseconomies of scope 
across markets. More specifically, demand in markets A and B for firm i are 
respectively given by 
 
pi = α i − qi − q j
j≠i
∑ ,  Pi = β i − Qi − Q j
j≠ i
∑  
 
And the cost function of a firm i is given by  
 
Ci(qi,Qi) =
1
2
(qi + Qi)2 
                                                        
1
 The detailed proofs of the results can be found in a complete version of the paper at the 
following address: http://portail.univ-st-etienne.fr/bienvenue/recherche/working-papers-
creuset-2010-285615.kjsp?RH=0611171526yr. 
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2.2 Quality Improving Links and Collaborative Networks 
We assume that firms can improve the quality of their products via collaborative 
links in market A. More specifically, we suppose that if a firm has formed k links, 
then we have 
α i = γ 0 + γ ⋅ k, 
with γ0, γ ∈ IR+. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that γ0 > γ. For reasons that will be clear later, we 
assume γ0 is sufficiently large compared to γ, namely, 
 
 γ 0 >
n −1( )2
2
 
 
  
 
 
  ⋅ γ  
 
A collaborative network g is a list of pairs of firms who are linked to each other. 
For simplicity, we denote the link between i and j (where i ≠ j) by ij, so ij ∈ g 
indicates that i and j are linked in the network g.  
Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The network gN is referred to as the 
complete network. The set G = g ⊂ gN denotes the set of all possible networks on 
N. A network in which there are no links is called an empty network and is denoted 
by g0. We let g + ij denote the network formed by adding the link ij to the network g, 
and g - ij denote the network formed by deleting the link ij from the network g. A 
network profits function piI : G → R+ assigns some profits to firm i by virtue of being 
part of a network. Let pi = (pi1, pi1, …, pin) denote the vector of profits functions. Then 
pi combined with N defines a network game. 
A firm i's neighborhood Ni(g) is given by j ∈ N \ i  ij ∈ g and its cardinality 
is given by ηi(g) = Ni(g). ηi(g) is called the degree of firm i in network g. We also 
define N(g) as the set of firms that have at least one link. Let η(g) = #N(g) with the 
convention that if N(g) = ∅, we let η(g) = 1.  
We define as Li(g) = ij ∈ g the set of links in which firm i is involved. Let λ(g) = 
1/2(∑ηi(g)) be the total number of links in a network g. 
For any h ⊂ g, let g - h denotes the network formed by deleting the set of links h 
from the network g. Similarly, for h ⊂ gN \ g, g + h denotes the network formed by 
adding the link set h to the network g. Moreover we define g
-i = g \ Li(g) the resulting 
network once we remove firm i and all his links from the network g. A network g is 
regular if each firm has the same number of links. A path in g connecting i and j is a 
set of distinct firms i1, i2, …, ip), with p > 2, such that i1 = i, ip = j, and i1i2, i2i3, …, 
ip-1ip ∈ g. We refer to the number of links on this path, here p - 1, as the length of the 
path. We say i and j are connected to each other if a path exists between them and 
they are disconnected otherwise. The number of links on the shortest path between 
two distinct firms i and j is called the geodesic distance between i and j. The network 
g’ ⊂ g is a component of g if N(g’) ≥ 2 and for all i ∈ N(g’) and j ∈ N(g’), i ≠ j, there 
exists a path in g’ connecting i and j and for any i ∈ N(g’) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies 
ij ∈ g’. In other words, a component is simply a maximally connected subnetwork of 
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g. We denote the set of network components of the network g by C(g). The set of 
firms that are not connected in the network g are connected in the set of (fully) 
disconnected firms in g denoted by  
 
N0(g) = N \ N(g) = i ∈ N  | N i(g) = ∅{ } 
 
Such firms are known as singletons. A component g’ ⊂ g is complete if for all 
distinct i j ∈ N(g’), ij ∈ g. A component g’ ⊂ g is regular if for all distinct i, j ∈ 
N(g’), ηi(g) = ηj(g). The dominant group architecture gk is characterized by one 
complete non-singleton component with k > 2 firms and n - k singletons. 
2.2 Equilibrium and efficient networks 
A network g is a pairwise equilibrium network with regard to a profile of profits 
functions pi = (pi1, pi2, …, pin) if 
 
(a) for all i and h ⊂ Li (g), pii(g) > pii(g - h), and 
(b) for all i and ij ∉ g, if pii (g + ij) > pii(g) then pij (g + ij) < pij(g). 
 
For any network g, and h ⊂ g N \ g, we denote the marginal benefit of link 
formation by ∆pii(g, h) = pii(g + h) - pii(g). Obviously, for a pairwise equilibrium 
network, ∆pii (g– h, h) > 0 for all h ⊂ Li (g), and for all ij ∉ g, if ∆pii(g, ij) > 0, then 
∆pij(g, ij) < 0. 
 
Next, we define efficient networks. Consider a welfare function W given by sum of 
payoffs of all the firms, i.e. W(g) = ∑i∈Npii(g). A network g’ is efficient if it 
maximizes the welfare function, that is W(g’) > W(g) for all g ≠ g’. For any network 
g, and h ⊂ gN \ g, we denote the marginal change in welfare as a result of link 
formation by ∆W(g, h) = W(g + h) - W(g). 
3   Characterization of Equilibrium Networks 
While the payoff functions are quite complicated, this game has features that were 
analyzed by Goyal and Joshi (2006). We will devote some space to reproducing their 
definitions and terminology. 
 
Definition 1 A network game is called playing the field game if the payoff of firm 
i is a function of her degree, ηi(g), and the total number of links formed by the other 
firms, λ(g
-i), namely,  
 
pi i(g) = Φ(ηi(g),λ(g− i)) . 
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Definition 2 The payoff function Φ is convex in its own links if the marginal 
returns Φ(k + 1, l) - Φ(k,l) is strictly increasing in k.  
 
Definition 3 Suppose l’ > l. The payoff function Φ satisfies the strategic substitutes 
property if Φ(k + 1,l’) - Φ(k,l’) < Φ(k + 1,l) - Φ(k,l).  
 
The next lemma is a reproduction of Proposition 3.1 of Goyal and Joshi (2006). 
 
Lemma 1 For a playing the field game, if the payoff function satisfies convexity in 
own links and the strategic substitutes property, then a pairwise equilibrium network 
always exists. Furthermore, a pairwise equilibrium network is either complete or 
empty or has the dominant group architecture.  
 
It is easy to check that the collaborative multimarket game qualifies as playing the 
field game. Furthermore, the payoff function satisfies convexity in own links as well 
as the strategic substitutes property. In fact, if we define 
 
∆(k, l) = Φ(k + 1, l) − Φ(k, l) , 
 
then we have 
 
∂∆(k,l)
∂k =
2γ 2(11n4 + 44n3 − 6n2 −100n + 83)
18(1+ n)2(3+ n)2 > 0  
and 
∂∆(k,l)
∂l =
2γ 2(22n3 +102n2 + 66n −158)
18(1+ n)2(3+ n)2 < 0  
 
Therefore, applying Lemma 1, we get the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1 The pairwise equilibrium network is either complete or empty or has a 
dominant group architecture. 
 
Few remarks are in order here. 
 
Remark 1 There are some surprising implications of this result. In the one-market 
Cournot model of GJ (2003), the dominant group architecture emerges if there are 
substantial link formation costs. Hence, introducing competition in additional markets 
has the same effect as introducing link formation costs. 
 
Remark 2 It is easy to show using BGK (1985) analysis that the empty network 
can be a pairwise equilibrium network when costs of forming links are null. The 
intuition behind this fact is as follows: the formation of a link by firms i and j in 
market A enhances the quality of their product in this market and leads these firms to 
produce more for this market. Due to joint diseconomies across markets this reduces 
marginal profitability for these firms associated with a unit of production in market B 
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and induces these firms to reduce their quantities on this market. Because of strategic 
substitutability, rival firms will increase their quantities on market B and this induces 
certainly a loss in market B, and possibly an overall loss for firms i and j. 
 
Remark 3 When the cost function exhibits economies of scope, there is no tension 
across markets anymore, that is the formation of a link by firms i and j in market A 
leads these firms to enhance the quantities produced on both markets at equilibrium. 
As a result the profits of these firms increase. It follows that when costs of forming 
links are null, the complete network is always the only equilibrium network. Thus we 
obtain the same result as in the Goyal and Joshi model where firms compete on one 
market only. 
3   Characterization of Efficient Networks 
In this section, we shall discuss efficient networks. While we do not obtain an 
exact characterization of efficient networks, we can identify certain properties of such 
networks. Consider the welfare effect of link formation between two arbitrary firms i 
and k in a network g. This effect is given by 
 
∆W (g,ik) = k' α i + αK −
τ '
n
α l + Λ' )l ± i,k∑
 
 
 
 
 
 − 2c  
where τ’ > 0, k’ > 0, and Λ’ are constants independent of network structure. τ’ has 
an upper bound less than 11 (at n = 2, its value is 10.79) and is strictly decreasing in 
n. It has a lower bound of 2 and converges asymptotically to 2. It is important to note 
that at n = 4, τ’ = 3.5. For the discussion that follows, let us assume n ≥ 3. 
 
Lemma 2 (i) For any network g and firm i such that ik, im ∉ g and ηm(g) > ηk(g), 
∆W(g + ik, im) > ∆W(g, ik), (ii) If ηm(g) = ηk(g), but n ≥ 4, ∆W(g + ik, im) > ∆W(g, 
ik) as well. 
 
Proof (i) Starting from an arbitrary network g with ik, im ∉ g. Suppose firm i and k 
form a link. The increase in welfare is proportional to: 
 
∆W (g,ik)
k '
= 2γ 0 + γ(ηi(g) + ηk (g))  
−
τ '
n
n − 2( )γ 0 + γ ηl (g) + γηm (g)l ± i,k,m∑( )+ Λ'− 2ck'  
 
Suppose then that firms i and m form a link. The increase in social welfare is 
proportional to 
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∆W (g + ik,im)
k '
=
∆W (g,ik)
k '
+ γ 2 + 1+ τ '
n
 
 
 
 
 
 ηm(g) −ηk (g) −1( ) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Now, since ηm(g) ≥ ηk(g) + 1,  this expression is positive, completing the proof. 
 
(ii) We have 
 
∆W (g + ik,im)
k '
=
∆W (g,ik)
k '
+ γ 1− τ '
n
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Since τ’ = 3.5 for n = 4, τ’/n < 1. Furthermore, τ’ and hence τ’/n are strictly 
decreasing in n, therefore τ’/n < 1 for all n > 4. Hence it follows that in all cases we 
have 
 
∆W (g + ik,im)
k '
>
∆W (g,ik)
k'
 
 
The following lemma plays a key role in the results that follow. 
 
Lemma 3 For any efficient network g, if ij ∈ g and ik ∉ g, then ηj(g) ≥ ηk(g). If 
n ≥ 4, then ηj(g) > ηk(g).  
 
Proof Suppose there exists an efficient network g and ij ∈ g and ik ∉ g. Then, 
∆W(g - ij, ij) > 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction, ηk(g) > ηj(g). This implies by 
Lemma 2 that ∆W(g, ik) > 0 contradicting that g is efficient. Hence, for all k such that 
ik ∉ g, ηk(g) <= ηj(g). 
Next let ηj(g) = ηk(g) and n ≥ 4. Again, ∆W(g, ik) > ∆W(g – ij, ij) > 0 which 
contradicts that g is efficient. Therefore, ηk(g) < ηj(g).  
 
The proposition below sets forth properties that characterize efficient networks. 
 
Proposition 1 (i) If n ≥ 4, then the efficient network cannot consist of more than 
one component, (ii) the geodesic distance between any two connected firms in a 
efficient network is less than or equal to 2. 
 
Proof (i) Suppose h1, h2 ∈ C(g) where g is an efficient network and ij ∈ h1 and kl 
∈ h2.  Now, i is linked to j and not to k which implies using Lemma 3, ηj(g) > ηk(g). 
But l is linked to k but not to j which implies ηk(g) > ηj(g). Hence, we arrive at a 
contradiction. 
 
(ii) Take two firms i and j such that i and j belong to N(h) where h ∈ C(g). Hence, 
a path exists between i and j. Suppose the shortest path is i1i2, i2i3, …, ip-1ip, where i1 
= i and ip = j, and p ≥ 4. i1 is linked to i2, but i1 is not linked to i3; i2 is linked to i3 but 
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i3 is not linked to i2. Hence, from Lemma 3, we get both ηi2(g) > ηi3(g) and ηi3(g) > 
ηi2(g). A contradiction.  
 
Remark It is noteworthy that pairwise equilibrium and efficient architectures do 
not coincide. Indeed, among non empty and non complete networks, while only 
networks with a complete component can be pairwise equilibrium, this is no longer 
true for efficient networks. Thus by contrast with pairwise equilibrium networks, in 
efficient networks firms who have formed links can be very asymmetric. Think for 
instance to a network where the component has a star architecture, that is one firm, 
say i has formed links with all other firms of the component while the latter have 
formed links only with firm i.  
3   Conclusion 
The dynamics of multi-market oligopolies first discussed in Bulow et al. (1985) 
can upset many results, which would hold in isolated oligopoly markets. Here we take 
the situation of collaborative link formation among Cournot oligopolists. The results 
that a complete network materializes in equilibrium when costs of links are null, no 
longer holds once we introduce multimarket competition. With positive link 
formation costs efficient networks have the very interesting feature that they consist 
of only one component with a very low diameter. An exact characterization of 
efficient networks in our framework, or more broadly in playing the field games, is an 
open question. 
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